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Case file TK-8f425322b1: Kimchi (Kimchi) — FJJy…pump

Kind: token · built 2026-10-23 18:13:59 UTC from the analysis snapshot of 2026-10-23 17:48:48 UTC (window 72 h) · builder cases-1.0

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Summary

  • Token Kimchi (FJJy…pump) was created 2026-10-20 23:07:58 UTC by wallet 29yF…kbw8 (wallet group Caf060463).
  • Market cap on the curve went from 33.8 SOL at the first trade to a peak of 332.9 SOL (3714 s after creation) and 28.9 SOL at the last trade seen.
  • 8 creator/early/group wallets realized +15.86 SOL on the curve; 18 public call(s) in the window.
  • 7 wallets other than the creator bought 23.8% of supply in the creation slot 459406901 and the next 2 slots; 4 of them (13.8% of supply) are linked to the creator: they are in the creator's wallet group or also bought in the first slots of 2+ other launches by the same creator.
  • The creator wallet bought 9.8% of supply and sold 100% of it; first sell 1 s after creation, realized +9.79 SOL.
  • Within 15 minutes after the call by ehxo at 2026-10-21 00:08:49 UTC, 2 wallets linked to the creator (creator, its wallet group, linked early buyers) sold 7.00 SOL (first sell 777 s after the call, versus 0.00 SOL in the 15 minutes before it); the market cap then fell 86% at its lowest within 1 h.
  • Caller Lury (wallet 9epB…ytCy) bought 0.519 SOL of the token 0.7 min before posting the call, then sold 100% 2.3 min after it, while 35 other wallets bought 17.94 SOL between the call and that sell (caller net +0.916 SOL). pump.fun callouts are tied to a position, so the buy before the call is expected; the flagged part is selling into the post-call buying.

Subject

mintFJJyKhFNCbE3awMjE9yPw2rXxCyaJM4ZYD9vE54Dpump
nameKimchi
symbolKimchi
creator29yFzeBZgxf5zqrAkKXwgZtQehRf4pL8WbV2nRJikbw8
creator groupCaf060463
bonding curveHPEUUGyGCKQqDmoNJpro6qD74ZtUE2T4rpzoQZiS97x1
created utc2026-10-20 23:07:58 UTC
creation sig5CA9KQRebr…PDSHY6ATWw
creation solscanhttps://solscan.io/tx/5CA9KQRebrZJvfbcaQNY3mzzczV4esKPWYicsfFUno9k4Zw7vbBG9ftYrzk3yn31wEe6YS2QYtgE9BPDSHY6ATWw
coin pagehttps://pump.fun/coin/FJJyKhFNCbE3awMjE9yPw2rXxCyaJM4ZYD9vE54Dpump
impersonation alertno
manipulation score94
token socialstwitter: https://x.com/ddddddd8a/status/2112682263267651960, website: https://pump.fun/profile/Kimchi?tab=activity
graduatedno

Detectors

Each detector reports on-chain facts only, with a confidence from 0 to 1 that the pattern is present (not a finding about intent or identity).

Bundled launch (linked wallets in the first slots) fired · confidence 0.79 (high)
7 wallets other than the creator bought 23.8% of supply in the creation slot 459406901 and the next 2 slots; 4 of them (13.8% of supply) are linked to the creator: they are in the creator's wallet group or also bought in the first slots of 2+ other launches by the same creator.
False-positive risk: Sniper bots buy in the first slots of many launches; we only count early buyers that the wallet-group rules link to the creator (the grouping ignores same-block buyers seen on more than 10 creators) or that bought early on 2+ other launches of the same creator. A bot that follows one prolific creator can still look linked.
Evidence transactions: 4NWW25…Ta3ayE jt1wKs…aCywZS 2pFNj2…iLZUvf
Creator sell-off fired · confidence 0.8 (high)
The creator wallet bought 9.8% of supply and sold 100% of it; first sell 1 s after creation, realized +9.79 SOL.
False-positive risk: Creators often sell their allocation early; a fast sell alone is common on pump.fun and is not proof of a scheme.
Evidence transactions: Rk7T4v…px5kzd B2M45E…vwyWLm yEkyPY…bYWsTj
Wash-like trading not fired
1 wallet(s) bought and sold back the same size (within 2%) inside 3 slots at least 3 times, 2.98 SOL or 0.3% of the 1142.1 SOL curve volume, with no lasting position; 0 of them are linked to the creator (0.00 SOL); 0 time(s) a linked wallet sold and another linked wallet bought the same size (within 5%) in the same or next slot.
False-positive risk: MEV/sandwich and arbitrage bots buy and sell back the same size within a few slots; we only flag this for wallets linked to the creator, but a linked wallet can still be running such a bot. Same-size hand-offs can be coincidence on busy tokens.
Evidence transactions: 4vfMVh…WSqcMj zMWHRA…QUy8qX 2TXZ3S…URkMLP
Coordinated sells after a call fired · confidence 0.86 (high)
Within 15 minutes after the call by ehxo at 2026-10-21 00:08:49 UTC, 2 wallets linked to the creator (creator, its wallet group, linked early buyers) sold 7.00 SOL (first sell 777 s after the call, versus 0.00 SOL in the 15 minutes before it); the market cap then fell 86% at its lowest within 1 h.
False-positive risk: Many traders react to the same call; wallets of a group selling at once can also be one bot managing several wallets for unrelated reasons.
Evidence transactions: 5K8v4v…GL1stZ 21yEiY…twPqh1 5j4F7a…zgPFJw
Caller bought before the call and sold into it fired · confidence 0.85 (high)
Caller Lury (wallet 9epB…ytCy) bought 0.519 SOL of the token 0.7 min before posting the call, then sold 100% 2.3 min after it, while 35 other wallets bought 17.94 SOL between the call and that sell (caller net +0.916 SOL). pump.fun callouts are tied to a position, so the buy before the call is expected; the flagged part is selling into the post-call buying.
False-positive risk: A caller can buy because they like the token and post it later; selling after posting can be ordinary profit-taking. We report timing only.
Evidence transactions: 3vfNWd…zgM8pw tpw8H5…KVXaUT 5iZQ9D…9GCaMy

Public calls

Time (UTC)CallerWalletFollowersMcap USD at callLinks
2026-10-20 23:09:13 UTCGODOFCALLOUTS10DN1k…Z4rt2726407.0 pump.fun
2026-10-20 23:09:17 UTCLury9epB…ytCy2726295.0 pump.fun
2026-10-20 23:16:37 UTCusernamebondES5M…RUae10415920.0 pump.fun
2026-10-20 23:18:46 UTCMoneymaker02212fPK…68t91137811.0 @SharkCoinGtaVI pump.fun
2026-10-20 23:20:01 UTCBunchainedE4x2…ep2X3058408.0 pump.fun

Timeline

8 of 122 events shown (first buy per wallet; all creator trades; calls; peak; last trade).

Time (UTC)EventWallet / callerSOLTokens (% supply)Mcap SOLTx / link
2026-10-20 23:07:57 UTCtoken created 29yF…kbw85CA9KQ…Y6ATWw
2026-10-20 23:07:58 UTCcreator buy 29yF…kbw83.097545454.55 (9.75%)33.835CA9KQ…Y6ATWw
2026-10-20 23:07:58 UTCearly buyer buy GTnb…Wukr2.4467158834.39 (6.72%)39.024NWW25…Ta3ayE
2026-10-20 23:07:58 UTCearly buyer buy Gg3s…XcDv2.5861636058.25 (6.16%)44.91jt1wKs…aCywZS
2026-10-20 23:07:58 UTCearly buyer buy 5673…k84M2.96361211318.33 (6.12%)52.183ufBVz…iS3sQ4
2026-10-20 23:07:58 UTCearly buyer buy G9sQ…j7ob0.49389351632.99 (0.94%)53.442pFNj2…iLZUvf
2026-10-20 23:07:58 UTCearly buyer buy uwuR…Nxn30.19753678597.44 (0.37%)53.955rB3Qk…BmQ1gT
2026-10-20 23:07:58 UTCearly buyer buy DRWP…23Gf1.975334954801.86 (3.50%)59.19DdgJoY…76AvZM

Price impact (bonding curve, SOL market cap)

first mcap sol33.83
peak mcap sol332.875
peak time utc2026-10-21 00:09:53 UTC
last mcap sol28.914
drawdown from peak0.913

Supporting transactions

5 shown of 155. Every row can be checked on Solscan or any Solana node.

Time (UTC)SlotWalletRoleSideSOLTokensSignature
2026-10-20 23:07:58 UTC45940690129yF…kbw8creatorbuy3.097545454.54555CA9KQ…Y6ATWw
2026-10-20 23:07:58 UTC459406901GTnb…Wukrearly buyer (first 3 slots)buy2.4467158834.39364NWW25…Ta3ayE
2026-10-20 23:07:58 UTC459406901Gg3s…XcDvearly buyer (first 3 slots)buy2.5861636058.2466jt1wKs…aCywZS
2026-10-20 23:07:58 UTC4594069015673…k84Mearly buyer (first 3 slots)buy2.96296361211318.32883ufBVz…iS3sQ4
2026-10-20 23:07:58 UTC459406902G9sQ…j7obearly buyer (first 3 slots)buy0.4938279351632.98932pFNj2…iLZUvf

Limitations

  • Bonding-curve trades on pump.fun only (decoded from public Solana data by our collector); trades after migration to a DEX and transfers outside the curve are not in P&L.
  • P&L is in SOL, before fees and priority tips; unrealized value uses the last bonding-curve price, which a large sale could not achieve.
  • Wallet links are statistical (shared creation-block buying, shared funding wallet, shared exchange deposit path); one person can use many wallets and unrelated people can share infrastructure such as bots.
  • Caller (KOL) call times are pump.fun home-feed callout times; we link the caller's public X profile and, where we captured it, the post. Telegram calls are not collected.
  • Exchange cash-out paths follow up to 3 hops of plain SOL/USDC transfers and stop at labeled exchange wallets; amounts are upper bounds of the traced wallet's money on that path.
  • Collector gaps (RPC drops) can miss a small share of trades; transaction signatures can be checked independently on Solscan or any Solana node.

Integrity

SHA-256 of the full pack: 14256b4921b420c397f260c96545055afe76c5b3e2d1e247b5404458502eec37
Retrieved/built at: 2026-10-23 18:13:59 UTC
Method: JSON of the pack without the "integrity" field, keys sorted, separators (",", ":"), UTF-8, no ASCII escaping. Verify with the JSON from /v1/forensics/case/TK-8f425322b1: python3 -c "import json,hashlib,sys;p=json.load(open(sys.argv[1]));p=p.get('pack',p);p.pop('integrity',None);print(hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(p,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':'),ensure_ascii=False).encode()).hexdigest())" pack.json

Automated analysis of public blockchain data. Detectors report on-chain facts and patterns "consistent with" known manipulation techniques; they make no claim about the intent or identity of any person. Wallets are not linked to real identities. Exchange labels come from public datasets and can be wrong. Not legal, financial or investment advice. Corrections: admin@deepcounterfeit.com.