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Case file TK-4fc433332d: Particle (Particle) — 8zFg…pump

Kind: token · built 2026-10-23 18:13:55 UTC from the analysis snapshot of 2026-10-23 17:48:48 UTC (window 72 h) · builder cases-1.0

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Summary

  • Token Particle (8zFg…pump) was created 2026-10-22 08:53:13 UTC by wallet 9gm3…zKUV (wallet group C906babd9).
  • Market cap on the curve went from 33.8 SOL at the first trade to a peak of 219.7 SOL (189 s after creation) and 28.5 SOL at the last trade seen.
  • 5 creator/early/group wallets realized +22.78 SOL on the curve; 0 public call(s) in the window.
  • 4 wallets other than the creator bought 44.7% of supply in the creation slot 459974442 and the next 2 slots; 2 of them (36.7% of supply) are linked to the creator: they are in the creator's wallet group or also bought in the first slots of 2+ other launches by the same creator.
  • The creator wallet bought 9.7% of supply and sold 100% of it; first sell 220 s after creation, realized +0.06 SOL.

Subject

mint8zFg1df4Uxe9RvR4dNedoMwmbP3ttDwXmVfVqqYLpump
nameParticle
symbolParticle
creator9gm3zg2cMHghj2Lc1jQ5u7VDxVCDRkDvvCQaRrqEzKUV
creator groupC906babd9
bonding curve2bWZoLgq2mZgtfRxHCcmww5V6DpU9UAT7wFqpbSeW8WF
created utc2026-10-22 08:53:13 UTC
creation sigwPch3MC4v5…2VCc1cEkea
creation solscanhttps://solscan.io/tx/wPch3MC4v5xffgU3UUFtMjjBzDwDFnAJHMCyC8NRsakcE5myEBBvjjAD5jeuvMarqpLSLD8XiQ6at2VCc1cEkea
coin pagehttps://pump.fun/coin/8zFg1df4Uxe9RvR4dNedoMwmbP3ttDwXmVfVqqYLpump
impersonation alertno
manipulation score80
token socials
graduatedno

Detectors

Each detector reports on-chain facts only, with a confidence from 0 to 1 that the pattern is present (not a finding about intent or identity).

Bundled launch (linked wallets in the first slots) fired · confidence 0.78 (high)
4 wallets other than the creator bought 44.7% of supply in the creation slot 459974442 and the next 2 slots; 2 of them (36.7% of supply) are linked to the creator: they are in the creator's wallet group or also bought in the first slots of 2+ other launches by the same creator.
False-positive risk: Sniper bots buy in the first slots of many launches; we only count early buyers that the wallet-group rules link to the creator (the grouping ignores same-block buyers seen on more than 10 creators) or that bought early on 2+ other launches of the same creator. A bot that follows one prolific creator can still look linked.
Evidence transactions: 2xBfLk…6r7x9M 64hXQH…E4cPkd 5tGxiu…cZ5ULr
Creator sell-off fired · confidence 0.72 (medium)
The creator wallet bought 9.7% of supply and sold 100% of it; first sell 220 s after creation, realized +0.06 SOL.
False-positive risk: Creators often sell their allocation early; a fast sell alone is common on pump.fun and is not proof of a scheme.
Evidence transactions: YNXpMw…nSM1SM
Wash-like trading not fired
0 wallet(s) bought and sold back the same size (within 2%) inside 3 slots at least 3 times, 0.00 SOL or 0.0% of the 151.8 SOL curve volume, with no lasting position; 0 of them are linked to the creator (0.00 SOL); 0 time(s) a linked wallet sold and another linked wallet bought the same size (within 5%) in the same or next slot.
False-positive risk: MEV/sandwich and arbitrage bots buy and sell back the same size within a few slots; we only flag this for wallets linked to the creator, but a linked wallet can still be running such a bot. Same-size hand-offs can be coincidence on busy tokens.
Coordinated sells after a call not fired
No public callout on this token in the window.
False-positive risk: Many traders react to the same call; wallets of a group selling at once can also be one bot managing several wallets for unrelated reasons.
Caller bought before the call and sold into it not fired
No caller wallet bought before its call.
False-positive risk: A caller can buy because they like the token and post it later; selling after posting can be ordinary profit-taking. We report timing only.

Related case files: CL-C906babd9

Timeline

8 of 15 events shown (first buy per wallet; all creator trades; calls; peak; last trade).

Time (UTC)EventWallet / callerSOLTokens (% supply)Mcap SOLTx / link
2026-10-22 08:53:10 UTCtoken created 9gm3…zKUVwPch3M…1cEkea
2026-10-22 08:53:11 UTCcreator buy 9gm3…zKUV2.971896710229.8 (9.67%)33.77wPch3M…1cEkea
2026-10-22 08:53:11 UTCearly buyer buy 6vR8…ujuf19.802366327412.46 (36.63%)86.522xBfLk…6r7x9M
2026-10-22 08:53:11 UTCearly buyer buy 3fRK…NmT67.920879601640.83 (7.96%)114.445tGxiu…cZ5ULr
2026-10-22 08:53:11 UTCearly buyer buy EgWx…tZYm0.1086947638.48 (0.09%)114.8564hXQH…E4cPkd
2026-10-22 08:53:11 UTCearly buyer buy 2WVd…uSJA0.0001859.93114.855NpE3Q…Pu2QPg
2026-10-22 08:54:16 UTCearly buyer sell EgWx…tZYm0.1105947638.48 (0.09%)116.432R3Qnw…Q3UqyW
2026-10-22 08:55:16 UTCearly buyer sell 2WVd…uSJA0.0002859.93182.495a3Eu2…RCjtNP

Price impact (bonding curve, SOL market cap)

first mcap sol33.773
peak mcap sol219.741
peak time utc2026-10-22 08:56:23 UTC
last mcap sol28.458
drawdown from peak0.87

Supporting transactions

5 shown of 12. Every row can be checked on Solscan or any Solana node.

Time (UTC)SlotWalletRoleSideSOLTokensSignature
2026-10-22 08:53:11 UTC4599744429gm3…zKUVcreatorbuy2.97176896710229.8013wPch3M…1cEkea
2026-10-22 08:53:11 UTC4599744426vR8…ujufearly buyer (first 3 slots)buy19.80198366327412.45852xBfLk…6r7x9M
2026-10-22 08:53:11 UTC4599744423fRK…NmT6early buyer (first 3 slots)buy7.92079279601640.82865tGxiu…cZ5ULr
2026-10-22 08:53:11 UTC459974443EgWx…tZYmearly buyer (first 3 slots)buy0.108642947638.47764hXQH…E4cPkd
2026-10-22 08:53:11 UTC4599744432WVd…uSJAearly buyer (first 3 slots)buy9.9e-05859.92775NpE3Q…Pu2QPg

Limitations

  • Bonding-curve trades on pump.fun only (decoded from public Solana data by our collector); trades after migration to a DEX and transfers outside the curve are not in P&L.
  • P&L is in SOL, before fees and priority tips; unrealized value uses the last bonding-curve price, which a large sale could not achieve.
  • Wallet links are statistical (shared creation-block buying, shared funding wallet, shared exchange deposit path); one person can use many wallets and unrelated people can share infrastructure such as bots.
  • Caller (KOL) call times are pump.fun home-feed callout times; we link the caller's public X profile and, where we captured it, the post. Telegram calls are not collected.
  • Exchange cash-out paths follow up to 3 hops of plain SOL/USDC transfers and stop at labeled exchange wallets; amounts are upper bounds of the traced wallet's money on that path.
  • Collector gaps (RPC drops) can miss a small share of trades; transaction signatures can be checked independently on Solscan or any Solana node.

Integrity

SHA-256 of the full pack: 2857b57c9f20643d077c17a55c00e14b440b7db28b856a7a84ac883fe095e24c
Retrieved/built at: 2026-10-23 18:13:55 UTC
Method: JSON of the pack without the "integrity" field, keys sorted, separators (",", ":"), UTF-8, no ASCII escaping. Verify with the JSON from /v1/forensics/case/TK-4fc433332d: python3 -c "import json,hashlib,sys;p=json.load(open(sys.argv[1]));p=p.get('pack',p);p.pop('integrity',None);print(hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(p,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':'),ensure_ascii=False).encode()).hexdigest())" pack.json

Automated analysis of public blockchain data. Detectors report on-chain facts and patterns "consistent with" known manipulation techniques; they make no claim about the intent or identity of any person. Wallets are not linked to real identities. Exchange labels come from public datasets and can be wrong. Not legal, financial or investment advice. Corrections: admin@deepcounterfeit.com.