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Case file KOL-80a5268dae: Caller GoatedCallsOnly (@xVolkzGaming) — GjGX…Jj2p

Kind: kol · built 2026-10-23 18:17:14 UTC from the analysis snapshot of 2026-10-23 17:48:48 UTC (window 72 h) · builder cases-1.0

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Summary

  • On 19 of 21 calls of tokens it did not create, wallet GjGX…Jj2p bought before posting (median 0.4 min before) and sold 50%+ within 30 minutes after (median 2.8 min after the call) while other wallets were buying (91.35 SOL from 428 buys-by-wallet between the calls and the sells); net +3.470 SOL on those calls. pump.fun callouts are tied to a position, so holding before the call is expected; the flagged part is selling into post-call buying.
  • 0 of 21 called tokens fell 50%+ below the call-time market cap within 1 h. This is a market outcome, not evidence of the caller's own selling; shown as context and not counted as a detector.

Subject

walletGjGXyrPd1VjHFHQ18BMv8jC4d8HJSbvYQETcH3GRJj2p
pumpfun handleGoatedCallsOnly
x handlexVolkzGaming
x profilehttps://x.com/xVolkzGaming
followers5400
on public kol listno
transfers from traced creators0

Detectors

Each detector reports on-chain facts only, with a confidence from 0 to 1 that the pattern is present (not a finding about intent or identity).

Caller bought before its calls and sold into them fired · confidence 0.9 (high)
On 19 of 21 calls of tokens it did not create, wallet GjGX…Jj2p bought before posting (median 0.4 min before) and sold 50%+ within 30 minutes after (median 2.8 min after the call) while other wallets were buying (91.35 SOL from 428 buys-by-wallet between the calls and the sells); net +3.470 SOL on those calls. pump.fun callouts are tied to a position, so holding before the call is expected; the flagged part is selling into post-call buying.
False-positive risk: A caller can buy because they like the token and post it later; selling after posting can be ordinary profit-taking. We report timing only.
Evidence transactions: 4TpXJc…YLqsKX 3PyLvE…NynqNP 2NMs6n…CTs2PW
Called tokens fell 50%+ within 1 h (context, not a detector) not fired
0 of 21 called tokens fell 50%+ below the call-time market cap within 1 h. This is a market outcome, not evidence of the caller's own selling; shown as context and not counted as a detector.
False-positive risk: Many traders react to the same call; wallets of a group selling at once can also be one bot managing several wallets for unrelated reasons.

Calls (third-party tokens)

TokenFirst buy (UTC)Call (UTC)Min buy→callMin call→sellBought SOLSold in 30 minOthers bought before caller soldNet SOLMcap at call / min 1 hLinks
RIVALY2026-10-20 17:46:58 UTC2026-10-20 17:47:13 UTC0.38.60.9832100% (1.329 SOL)2.4126 SOL / 18 wallets+0.34633.05 / -15%X profile
FUN2026-10-21 00:37:06 UTC2026-10-21 00:37:24 UTC0.30.98320% (0.0 SOL)0.7683 SOL / 8 wallets-0.98335.46 / -21%X profile
TRENCHD2026-10-21 01:01:30 UTC2026-10-21 01:01:52 UTC0.45.00.9832100% (1.1659 SOL)8.1691 SOL / 49 wallets+0.18340.58 / -30%X profile
LEMON2026-10-21 01:12:22 UTC2026-10-21 01:12:38 UTC0.30.98320% (0.0 SOL)0.0 SOL / 0 wallets-0.98342.33 / -34%X profile
RIVALY2026-10-21 01:23:26 UTC2026-10-21 01:23:44 UTC0.34.60.9832100% (1.0314 SOL)3.5639 SOL / 17 wallets+0.04839.13 / -27%X profile

Timeline

8 of 61 events shown (first buy per wallet; all creator trades; calls; peak; last trade).

Time (UTC)EventWallet / callerSOLTokens (% supply)Mcap SOLTx / link
2026-10-20 17:46:58 UTCcaller buy (before call) RIVALY
2026-10-20 17:47:13 UTCpublic call RIVALY
2026-10-20 17:55:49 UTCcaller sell (after call) RIVALY
2026-10-21 00:37:06 UTCcaller buy (before call) FUN
2026-10-21 00:37:24 UTCpublic call FUN
2026-10-21 01:01:30 UTCcaller buy (before call) TRENCHD
2026-10-21 01:01:52 UTCpublic call TRENCHD
2026-10-21 01:06:53 UTCcaller sell (after call) TRENCHD

Supporting transactions

5 shown of 41. Every row can be checked on Solscan or any Solana node.

Time (UTC)SlotWalletRoleSideSOLTokensSignature
2026-10-20 17:46:58 UTC459317874GjGX…Jj2pcallerbuy0.9832130972788.04924TpXJc…YLqsKX
2026-10-20 17:55:49 UTC459320319GjGX…Jj2pcallersell1.3289840074217.56233PyLvE…NynqNP
2026-10-21 00:37:06 UTC459431521GjGX…Jj2pcallerbuy0.9832130972788.04922NMs6n…CTs2PW
2026-10-21 01:01:30 UTC459438268GjGX…Jj2pcallerbuy0.9832127442861.23114fH3RC…pArkRw
2026-10-21 01:06:53 UTC459439754GjGX…Jj2pcallersell1.16586127672890.76533qLaK4…uPG7TF

Limitations

  • Bonding-curve trades on pump.fun only (decoded from public Solana data by our collector); trades after migration to a DEX and transfers outside the curve are not in P&L.
  • P&L is in SOL, before fees and priority tips; unrealized value uses the last bonding-curve price, which a large sale could not achieve.
  • Wallet links are statistical (shared creation-block buying, shared funding wallet, shared exchange deposit path); one person can use many wallets and unrelated people can share infrastructure such as bots.
  • Caller (KOL) call times are pump.fun home-feed callout times; we link the caller's public X profile and, where we captured it, the post. Telegram calls are not collected.
  • Exchange cash-out paths follow up to 3 hops of plain SOL/USDC transfers and stop at labeled exchange wallets; amounts are upper bounds of the traced wallet's money on that path.
  • Collector gaps (RPC drops) can miss a small share of trades; transaction signatures can be checked independently on Solscan or any Solana node.

Integrity

SHA-256 of the full pack: 0f4f74d94b165a04155a5b53b1e8b9a56031653eb11e888a79b634e4968b21e2
Retrieved/built at: 2026-10-23 18:17:14 UTC
Method: JSON of the pack without the "integrity" field, keys sorted, separators (",", ":"), UTF-8, no ASCII escaping. Verify with the JSON from /v1/forensics/case/KOL-80a5268dae: python3 -c "import json,hashlib,sys;p=json.load(open(sys.argv[1]));p=p.get('pack',p);p.pop('integrity',None);print(hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(p,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':'),ensure_ascii=False).encode()).hexdigest())" pack.json

Automated analysis of public blockchain data. Detectors report on-chain facts and patterns "consistent with" known manipulation techniques; they make no claim about the intent or identity of any person. Wallets are not linked to real identities. Exchange labels come from public datasets and can be wrong. Not legal, financial or investment advice. Corrections: admin@deepcounterfeit.com.