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Case file KOL-7d42f9f52c: Caller banval (@Ban_Val) — EqiF…r1Zb

Kind: kol · built 2026-10-23 18:14:41 UTC from the analysis snapshot of 2026-10-23 17:48:48 UTC (window 72 h) · builder cases-1.0

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Summary

On 26 of 56 calls of tokens it did not create, wallet EqiF…r1Zb bought before posting (median 0.3 min before) and sold 50%+ within 30 minutes after (median 1.8 min after the call) while other wallets were buying (1690.12 SOL from 3335 buys-by-wallet between the calls and the sells); net +10.431 SOL on those calls. pump.fun callouts are tied to a position, so holding before the call is expected; the flagged part is selling into post-call buying.
25 of 56 called tokens fell 50%+ below the call-time market cap within 1 h. This is a market outcome, not evidence of the caller's own selling; shown as context and not counted as a detector.

Subject

wallet	`EqiFgyNw6kgrmYstWyrP8VjKhka7XEmKTZzHSmwpr1Zb`
pumpfun handle	banval
x handle	Ban_Val
x profile	https://x.com/Ban_Val
followers	18931
on public kol list	yes
transfers from traced creators	0

Detectors

Each detector reports on-chain facts only, with a confidence from 0 to 1 that the pattern is present (not a finding about intent or identity).

Caller bought before its calls and sold into them fired · confidence 0.76 (high)
On 26 of 56 calls of tokens it did not create, wallet EqiF…r1Zb bought before posting (median 0.3 min before) and sold 50%+ within 30 minutes after (median 1.8 min after the call) while other wallets were buying (1690.12 SOL from 3335 buys-by-wallet between the calls and the sells); net +10.431 SOL on those calls. pump.fun callouts are tied to a position, so holding before the call is expected; the flagged part is selling into post-call buying.
False-positive risk: A caller can buy because they like the token and post it later; selling after posting can be ordinary profit-taking. We report timing only.
Evidence transactions: bMEkaJ…BDKS32 2CKrFg…2Jd3rP e7ukmE…vD8yz6

Called tokens fell 50%+ within 1 h (context, not a detector) not fired
25 of 56 called tokens fell 50%+ below the call-time market cap within 1 h. This is a market outcome, not evidence of the caller's own selling; shown as context and not counted as a detector.
False-positive risk: Many traders react to the same call; wallets of a group selling at once can also be one bot managing several wallets for unrelated reasons.

Calls (third-party tokens)

Token	First buy (UTC)	Call (UTC)	Min buy→call	Min call→sell	Bought SOL	Sold in 30 min	Others bought before caller sold	Net SOL	Mcap at call / min 1 h	Links
Xitter	2026-10-20 16:49:46 UTC	2026-10-20 16:50:31 UTC	0.8		2.4053	0% (0.0 SOL)	21.0527 SOL / 22 wallets	-2.405	325.3 / -3%	X profile
Gary		2026-10-20 16:58:52 UTC			0.0	0% (0.0 SOL)	0.0 SOL / 0 wallets		/	X profile
Xitter	2026-10-20 17:03:09 UTC	2026-10-20 17:05:25 UTC	2.3		4.134	0% (0.0 SOL)	230.6848 SOL / 306 wallets	-4.134	78.49 / +3%	X profile
PIKACAT		2026-10-20 17:30:24 UTC			0.0	0% (0.0 SOL)	0.0 SOL / 0 wallets		/	X profile
PCS	2026-10-20 17:37:10 UTC	2026-10-20 17:37:31 UTC	0.4	0.8	0.9387	100% (0.6119 SOL)	41.9629 SOL / 86 wallets	-0.327	112.27 / -75%	X profile

Timeline

8 of 119 events shown (first buy per wallet; all creator trades; calls; peak; last trade).

Time (UTC)	Event	Wallet / caller	SOL	Tokens (% supply)	Mcap SOL	Tx / link
2026-10-20 16:49:46 UTC	caller buy (before call) Xitter
2026-10-20 16:50:31 UTC	public call Xitter
2026-10-20 16:58:52 UTC	public call Gary
2026-10-20 17:03:09 UTC	caller buy (before call) Xitter
2026-10-20 17:05:25 UTC	public call Xitter
2026-10-20 17:30:24 UTC	public call PIKACAT
2026-10-20 17:37:10 UTC	caller buy (before call) PCS
2026-10-20 17:37:31 UTC	public call PCS

Supporting transactions

5 shown of 109. Every row can be checked on Solscan or any Solana node.

Time (UTC)	Slot	Wallet	Role	Side	SOL	Tokens	Signature
2026-10-20 16:49:46 UTC	459302037	`EqiF…r1Zb`	caller	buy	0.938667	4412652.5444	`bMEkaJ…BDKS32`
2026-10-20 16:50:13 UTC	459302162	`EqiF…r1Zb`	caller	buy	0.488889	1549234.2031	`2CKrFg…2Jd3rP`
2026-10-20 16:50:13 UTC	459302163	`EqiF…r1Zb`	caller	buy	0.488889	1533285.3744	`e7ukmE…vD8yz6`
2026-10-20 16:50:13 UTC	459302165	`EqiF…r1Zb`	caller	buy	0.488889	1518593.5573	`3bCv5f…L9XcnR`
2026-10-20 17:03:09 UTC	459305756	`EqiF…r1Zb`	caller	buy	0.750933	14168686.6637	`HgS6HQ…qu4f8b`

Limitations

Bonding-curve trades on pump.fun only (decoded from public Solana data by our collector); trades after migration to a DEX and transfers outside the curve are not in P&L.
P&L is in SOL, before fees and priority tips; unrealized value uses the last bonding-curve price, which a large sale could not achieve.
Wallet links are statistical (shared creation-block buying, shared funding wallet, shared exchange deposit path); one person can use many wallets and unrelated people can share infrastructure such as bots.
Caller (KOL) call times are pump.fun home-feed callout times; we link the caller's public X profile and, where we captured it, the post. Telegram calls are not collected.
Exchange cash-out paths follow up to 3 hops of plain SOL/USDC transfers and stop at labeled exchange wallets; amounts are upper bounds of the traced wallet's money on that path.
Collector gaps (RPC drops) can miss a small share of trades; transaction signatures can be checked independently on Solscan or any Solana node.

Integrity

SHA-256 of the full pack: b4962c1f439cd425513c923bfb425de7ebea37319bb9b27b0b2137b2b3d2eed7
Retrieved/built at: 2026-10-23 18:14:41 UTC
Method: JSON of the pack without the "integrity" field, keys sorted, separators (",", ":"), UTF-8, no ASCII escaping. Verify with the JSON from /v1/forensics/case/KOL-7d42f9f52c: python3 -c "import json,hashlib,sys;p=json.load(open(sys.argv[1]));p=p.get('pack',p);p.pop('integrity',None);print(hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(p,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':'),ensure_ascii=False).encode()).hexdigest())" pack.json

Automated analysis of public blockchain data. Detectors report on-chain facts and patterns "consistent with" known manipulation techniques; they make no claim about the intent or identity of any person. Wallets are not linked to real identities. Exchange labels come from public datasets and can be wrong. Not legal, financial or investment advice. Corrections: admin@deepcounterfeit.com.