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Case file KOL-0616f90e38: Caller ewakez — 7g2M…8r11

Kind: kol · built 2026-10-23 18:14:35 UTC from the analysis snapshot of 2026-10-23 17:48:48 UTC (window 72 h) · builder cases-1.0

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Summary

On 17 of 29 calls of tokens it did not create, wallet 7g2M…8r11 bought before posting (median 0.4 min before) and sold 50%+ within 30 minutes after (median 1.6 min after the call) while other wallets were buying (734.96 SOL from 1465 buys-by-wallet between the calls and the sells); net -0.386 SOL on those calls. pump.fun callouts are tied to a position, so holding before the call is expected; the flagged part is selling into post-call buying.
15 of 29 called tokens fell 50%+ below the call-time market cap within 1 h. This is a market outcome, not evidence of the caller's own selling; shown as context and not counted as a detector.

Subject

wallet	`7g2MgxsjbR5Tpw9GgQtTXZMQgstXPS3fyJ3rfyKM8r11`
pumpfun handle	ewakez
followers	1338
on public kol list	no
transfers from traced creators	0

Detectors

Each detector reports on-chain facts only, with a confidence from 0 to 1 that the pattern is present (not a finding about intent or identity).

Caller bought before its calls and sold into them fired · confidence 0.81 (high)
On 17 of 29 calls of tokens it did not create, wallet 7g2M…8r11 bought before posting (median 0.4 min before) and sold 50%+ within 30 minutes after (median 1.6 min after the call) while other wallets were buying (734.96 SOL from 1465 buys-by-wallet between the calls and the sells); net -0.386 SOL on those calls. pump.fun callouts are tied to a position, so holding before the call is expected; the flagged part is selling into post-call buying.
False-positive risk: A caller can buy because they like the token and post it later; selling after posting can be ordinary profit-taking. We report timing only.
Evidence transactions: QPdqNA…N2U3fz 4RWaAb…XfTzvP 4Lj9uB…pLRUCi

Called tokens fell 50%+ within 1 h (context, not a detector) not fired
15 of 29 called tokens fell 50%+ below the call-time market cap within 1 h. This is a market outcome, not evidence of the caller's own selling; shown as context and not counted as a detector.
False-positive risk: Many traders react to the same call; wallets of a group selling at once can also be one bot managing several wallets for unrelated reasons.

Calls (third-party tokens)

Token	First buy (UTC)	Call (UTC)	Min buy→call	Min call→sell	Bought SOL	Sold in 30 min	Others bought before caller sold	Net SOL	Mcap at call / min 1 h
PFC		2026-10-21 16:38:46 UTC			0.0	0% (0.0 SOL)	0.0 SOL / 0 wallets		/
FIRSTJET	2026-10-21 16:42:30 UTC	2026-10-21 16:42:40 UTC	0.2	6.2	0.141	100% (0.1456 SOL)	101.3294 SOL / 172 wallets	+0.005	115.99 / -74%
Human	2026-10-21 16:48:22 UTC	2026-10-21 16:48:30 UTC	0.1	1.0	0.0523	100% (0.1083 SOL)	52.4422 SOL / 113 wallets	+0.056	43.34 / -34%
OPENAPE · case	2026-10-21 16:49:55 UTC	2026-10-21 16:50:17 UTC	0.4	1.6	0.1481	100% (0.056 SOL)	85.6201 SOL / 163 wallets	-0.092	98.98 / -72%
OPENAPE	2026-10-21 16:52:08 UTC	2026-10-21 16:52:21 UTC	0.2	1.9	0.1034	100% (0.0353 SOL)	35.9135 SOL / 87 wallets	-0.068	130.29 / -78%

Timeline

8 of 67 events shown (first buy per wallet; all creator trades; calls; peak; last trade).

Time (UTC)	Event	Wallet / caller	SOL	Tokens (% supply)	Mcap SOL	Tx / link
2026-10-21 16:38:46 UTC	public call PFC
2026-10-21 16:42:30 UTC	caller buy (before call) FIRSTJET
2026-10-21 16:42:40 UTC	public call FIRSTJET
2026-10-21 16:48:22 UTC	caller buy (before call) Human
2026-10-21 16:48:30 UTC	public call Human
2026-10-21 16:48:52 UTC	caller sell (after call) FIRSTJET
2026-10-21 16:49:32 UTC	caller sell (after call) Human
2026-10-21 16:49:55 UTC	caller buy (before call) OPENAPE

Supporting transactions

5 shown of 41. Every row can be checked on Solscan or any Solana node.

Time (UTC)	Slot	Wallet	Role	Side	SOL	Tokens	Signature
2026-10-21 16:42:30 UTC	459700638	`7g2M…8r11`	caller	buy	0.14102	1220616.3993	`QPdqNA…N2U3fz`
2026-10-21 16:48:52 UTC	459702436	`7g2M…8r11`	caller	sell	0.145634	1752699.8726	`4RWaAb…XfTzvP`
2026-10-21 16:48:22 UTC	459702295	`7g2M…8r11`	caller	buy	0.052302	1138851.8769	`4Lj9uB…pLRUCi`
2026-10-21 16:49:32 UTC	459702624	`7g2M…8r11`	caller	sell	0.108312	1138851.8769	`3nRiyn…4RLyZE`
2026-10-21 16:49:55 UTC	459702733	`7g2M…8r11`	caller	buy	0.148105	640831.2572	`w8cwBZ…x8yjnc`

Limitations

Bonding-curve trades on pump.fun only (decoded from public Solana data by our collector); trades after migration to a DEX and transfers outside the curve are not in P&L.
P&L is in SOL, before fees and priority tips; unrealized value uses the last bonding-curve price, which a large sale could not achieve.
Wallet links are statistical (shared creation-block buying, shared funding wallet, shared exchange deposit path); one person can use many wallets and unrelated people can share infrastructure such as bots.
Caller (KOL) call times are pump.fun home-feed callout times; we link the caller's public X profile and, where we captured it, the post. Telegram calls are not collected.
Exchange cash-out paths follow up to 3 hops of plain SOL/USDC transfers and stop at labeled exchange wallets; amounts are upper bounds of the traced wallet's money on that path.
Collector gaps (RPC drops) can miss a small share of trades; transaction signatures can be checked independently on Solscan or any Solana node.

Integrity

SHA-256 of the full pack: 25651d0d2d390113715726abd02264a148a5376e770b140a541e5aa0106a99af
Retrieved/built at: 2026-10-23 18:14:35 UTC
Method: JSON of the pack without the "integrity" field, keys sorted, separators (",", ":"), UTF-8, no ASCII escaping. Verify with the JSON from /v1/forensics/case/KOL-0616f90e38: python3 -c "import json,hashlib,sys;p=json.load(open(sys.argv[1]));p=p.get('pack',p);p.pop('integrity',None);print(hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(p,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':'),ensure_ascii=False).encode()).hexdigest())" pack.json

Automated analysis of public blockchain data. Detectors report on-chain facts and patterns "consistent with" known manipulation techniques; they make no claim about the intent or identity of any person. Wallets are not linked to real identities. Exchange labels come from public datasets and can be wrong. Not legal, financial or investment advice. Corrections: admin@deepcounterfeit.com.